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SPEECH
Creating Local Competition
Joseph Farrell*
We are embarked on an exciting project to create competition in one
of the largest noncompetitive industries in the U.S. economy: the bottleneck
segment of telecommunications, the "last mile" to your home or office from
local "central office" switches. This is often somewhat misleadingly called
the "local telephone network."
That name is misleading, although I will doubtless end up using it out
of habit (I see I already did in the title). It's misleading because the
bottleneck facilities are used for communications both local and nonlocal.
These facilities-roughly speaking, loop and local switching-constitute a
bottleneck for local, semilocal, long-distance, international, and-we're
forward looking, right?--perhaps interplanetary service. Every call you
make from your home phone travels along the same loop to the same
central office switch, so perhaps we should call it the "bottleneckwork."
As this suggests, it's more helpful in various ways to focus on things
than on services. More on this later.
This bottleneck segment of the telecommunications network is
traditionally viewed as a "natural monopoly." What does this term mean?
It means that bigger is more efficient, to such an extent that two interrelated
conclusions follow. First, that competition cannot thrive, because a bigger
firm is more efficient and will therefore grow at the expense of a smaller
rival. Second, that competition would be inefficient, because one way or
another it involves splitting the market, with the result that no firm is as big
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(that is, efficient) as it could be.
Why, then, are we bent on implementing competition here? The short
answer is because, in the 1996 Telecom Act,' Congress tells us to. The
longer answer is that over the decades telephone regulation, like the tax
code, has grown unwieldy, unmanageable, inefficient, and dysfunctional. It's
time to find an alternative. Competition is the greatest technique ever
invented to bring about innovation, low prices, choice, and efficiency. If we
can efficiently create competition in this so-called natural monopoly, we'll
have done a great thing.
How great a thing? We won't know until we've tried it. But gains in
efficiency equal to several percent of gross revenues would be fairly modest
by the standards of what firms can achieve when challenged by competition.
Even price caps have led to much greater than predicted efficiency
gains---hence the phone companies' greater profitability under price
caps-and there are reasons to think price caps are a poor incentive system
compared to competition.
Not only do individual firms challenged by competition find ways to
cut prices and improve their products and their customer service, but
customers also get a choice, so even if (to pick on the local incumbent only
because it's the local incumbent) Bell Atlantic for some reason doesn't
respond and improve its offerings, Washingtonians may be able to choose
Ameritech's service, or Sprint's, or TCI's, or Microsoft's. Better firms
grow, which produces even higher powered incentives to be better, and
gives the average consumer more than the firm-by-firm average improve-
ment.
If competition is so wonderful, how come we don't have it? Well, I'm
not a historian, but I'll play one on closed-circuit TV to give you an
oversimplified version of how we got where we are. (I'll probably tell some
historical fibs-not on purpose-but I hope it'll still be helpful rather than
confusing.) It turns out that a little history helps a lot in understanding
where we can go from here.
Let's begin then with Alexander Graham Bell who was issued a patent
for his ingenious invention. Bell offered the patent to the telecommunica-
tions giant of the day, Western Union, for $100,000.2 They said no. (Bad
mistake!)
So Bell went into business to exploit this telephone gadget. The patent
was on the device, what phoneheads call the handset, and anyone can string
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
2. See MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 1.2.1
(1992).
[Vol. 49
CREATING LOCAL COMPETITION
a wire, so it seemed natural to rent out the handsets (at a high price,
reflecting the patent monopoly) and maybe even let people do their own
wiring.
The problem with this approach is that after seventeen years the patent
expires, and then Bell would have nothing: anyone else could market the
handsets, and anyone could string a wire. Fortunately, consciously or not,
the Bell Company came up with a brilliant idea: the switched network.
In a simple switched network, everyone is connected to a central node,
and an operator or machine connects the wires there in order to form a
circuit between the people who want to talk. This greatly reduces the
amount of wire needed: it's just more efficient, provided there are enough
customers and the switching function is not too expensive compared to
wires.
Much more interestingly, though, it also creates a difference in cost
between a large (or dense) network and a small (or sparse) network, if they
don't cooperate with one another. The denser network can have more lines
per switch and shorter wires (or loops). So, provided Bell could sign up
enough customers before its patent expired, it would have an automatic cost
advantage over any entrants, as long as the entrants were smaller.
And, for Bell, it's better than that. A smaller network, by definition,
has fewer subscribers, and so--again assuming they don't cooperate--it's
less likely that the person you need to reach subscribes to the smaller
network. Not only would Bell have a cost advantage over entrants, but
buyers would prefer Bell if the prices were equal, because of the larger base
of subscribers. Long before IBM or Microsoft, Bell came up with a business
strategy based on leveraging the advantages of its relatively large installed
base.
And, indeed, that's the way competition went after the patent expired.
Independents did thrive, but only where they could overcome those
advantages, because Bell had not built in an area, or had priced so high that
it left out too many potential customers, or in some other way failed to
exploit its advantage fully.
WARNiNG: ABSTRACT ECONOMICS AHEAD (BuT rr's IMPORTANT)
I'd like to pause here and make a rather abstract economic point that
I'll return to later. The patent was for an invention, essentially a piece of
information. Information is an unusual kind of economic good, because
sharing costs nothing. It's like the flu: I can give it to you and still have it
myself. So, it might seem dog-in-the-mangerish, and is economically
inefficient ex post, for an inventor to refuse to share.
But of course there's a reason an inventor may refuse to share:
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although sharing doesn't take anything away from me, it does give
something to my competitor, and in a competitive environment that makes
me worse off. Also, an inventor who is perfectly willing to share may want
the option of not sharing so as to extract some value from those who want
the information. And there's a good policy reason not to require sharing:
doing so might unduly reduce the reward to inventing. The patent system
is a compromise solution to this problem: the inventor can exclude others
for a while, but then must share.
Information is not the only competitive asset with those features. The
economies of density and the can-call-more-people advantage (what
economists call the "network externality") have the same property. For
instance, if Bell allowed the independents to interconnect, it wouldn't lose
network externalities-on the contrary, they would be enhanced. If the two
networks became one, with what we would now call unbundling, Bell
would not lose economies of density-on the contrary, they would be
enhanced. But Bell may prefer to exclude its rivals, because to a great
extent it is relative capabilities that matter in competition. No policy then
said that Bell must eventually share these efficiencies. In that sense there
was an unexplained asymmetry of policy: patent policy said eventual
sharing (without charge); no similar policy said the same for network
externalities and economies of density, despite the similarities I've pointed
out. We'll come back to this important point later.
REGULATION AND INFECTIOUS MONOPOLY
Skipping over a great deal of history, we come to regulation. As part
of the regulatory process, as we'll discuss briefly, the telephone system
became viewed as a single business entity, with just one economic
constraint: total revenues must correspond pretty much to total costs.
(Actually, that's not right, because of separations if nothing else. But that's
another story.)
It's not clear that regulators cared very much whether prices
corresponded to costs. If they ever did care, it probably got beaten out of
them by the recognition that, while they were setting prices for services
such as local flat-rate service and long-distance calls, costs really didn't
correspond to services at all. "Joint" or "common" costs-costs not directly
attributable to the services being priced-are tremendous. In particular, the
rather large cost of stringing a loop to your home is "common" to just
about every telephone service you can think of. This made it open season
for setting prices more or less however regulators wanted, provided only
that they raised the right amount of money in total.
If regulators chose-and they did-to charge consumers much more
[Vol. 49
CREATING LOCAL COMPETITION
than incremental cost for long-distance calls, they wouldn't have to charge
so much for local service, and that seemed like a good thing. If regulators
chose to charge businesses more than residents, and urban residents more
than rural residents, there was nothing to stop them. All these decisions, of
course, were far from simple, and involved interplay between state and
federal regulators, consumers, voters, and the companies. But, competitive
forces played little part.
On the contrary, once these internal cross-subsidies were in place,
competition became seen as an enemy. The most tempting place for
competitors to enter would be in the segments of the market where prices
were above cost. This wouldn't necessarily indicate that the competitors
were any more efficient than Bell, just that they were able to undercut the
inflated price. And not only might such competition be inefficient, it would
also threaten the internal subsidy flows to the favored segments of the
market where price was below cost. Recently, Professor Lawrence White
succinctly stated that: "competition is the enemy of cross-subsidies."3 As
we'll discuss later, this depends on how the cross-subsidies are structured,
but I think he's right as regards implicit internal cross-subsidies. And yet
the greater the cross-subsidies, the greater the incentive to enter.
Thus, it was tempting for regulators, who wanted to set prices without
having to worry about attracting nuisance competition, simply to prohibit
competition. Of course, this seemed like a pretty good idea to Bell too. So,
competition was out. As Professor White put it, "cross-subsidies are the
enemy of competition, because competition is the enemy of cross-
subsidies."
How far would such a ban on competition extend? From Bell's point
of view, the answer would probably be "as far as possible." Regulators
might join in that answer if they were thoroughly "captured" by the
regulated firm, as many cynics suggest regulators tend to be. Another
possible reason for regulators to regulate as much.as possible is bureaucratic
empire building. It's hard for us at the FCC this year to imagine the agency
trying to take on more work, but maybe things were different then.
But there's a more interesting answer, and one that attributes better
motives to regulators (so it's more acceptable in this room). The telephone
regulators saw themselves as benevolently trying to raise a "revenue
requirement" with the least possible pain. It was as if they were in the tax
business. And it's a well-established principle of economics that you
minimize the total pain of taxes by spreading them-not necessarily
uniformly-over as broad a tax base as possible. In any event, you have
3. Professor Lawrence White, Professor of Economics, New York University.
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more options.
So, for a variety of motives ranging from bad to good, the regulatory
view was hostile to competition even where competition could perhaps have
survived. The height of this attitude was the infamous Hush-A-Phone case.4
The Hush-A-Phone, as many of you know, was a rubber cup you'd put over
the mouthpiece of your phone to keep out extraneous noise and to get some
privacy. It was supplied by an independent firm. AT&T complained to the
FCC that this was intruding on the integrity of its "one system." And the
FCC agreed.'
Perhaps the only way to understand this decision is to put yourself in
the mindset of a regulator who knows that competition is the enemy, and
who sees incipient competition even in this innocent little low-tech gadget.
By gosh, you have to draw the line somewhere, and this thing was
"attached" to the handset, so it was attached to the network.
The courts overturned the FCC's Hush-A-Phone decision, reasoning
that there was no harm in such a device.' But, from the regulatory
viewpoint, perhaps the Commission may have been right to be paranoid
about it, because it brought in the logic of "why not peripheral competi-
tion?" As Professor Richard Vietor put it, "Deregulation began more or less
with a rubber cup."7
Thus, in due course various pieces were split off from the monopoly
system. Regulatory leverage weakened or became less fashionable. The best
known, of course, was MCI and the introduction of competition to long-
distance. The MCI story is too long to tell here, and is not our main point.
Let me try to summarize in a few sentences. MCI started by building a
"shared private" system, undercutting AT&T's long-distance prices, which,
recall, were well above incremental cost. MCI later fought long and hard
for interconnection with the Bell system's bottleneckworks, which AT&T
wanted to deny or to price at a high price. In the end, the solution was what
we know today as access charges-an explicit formalized contribution to the
bottleneck operator for long-distance use of the bottleneck work.
When AT&T was competing with MCI and others, but also controlled
the bottleneck, it became clear that AT&T had an incentive to discriminate
against MCI in interconnection. As regulatory leverage withdrew, it
appeared that business leverage was ready to do the same job, and
monopoly would tend to spread through such discrimination into long-
distance and other related, potentially competitive, segments.
4. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
5. Id. at 268.
6. Id.
7. RICHARD VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION 190 (1994)
[Vol. 49
CREATING LOCAL COMPETITION
Roughly speaking, there are two problems. First, if a local bottleneck
provider favors its long-distance affiliate by subtlely withdrawing full
cooperation from other long-distance companies, it can make excess profits
in long-distance because it has hamstrung its long-distance rivals. It may
make less money in its bottleneck as a result, but that may not deter it, and
then "infectious monopoly" results. Second, if a regulated monopolist, such
as the then AT&T, reports as bottleneck costs what are really long-distance
costs, it may be able to defraud ratepayers who are committed to covering
the costs of the bottleneck.
These problems are hard to regulate away, because the withdrawal of
cooperation from rivals may be subtle, shifting, and temporary, but yet have
real and permanent effects, and because cost allocation is a dark mystery.
Recognition of this difficulty led to a dramatic solution: the Modification
of Final Judgement (the MFJ), which quarantined the monopoly lest it
infect the competitive segments!
Under the MTFJ, then, the BOCs were excluded from a variety of
businesses in which they might well be efficient or strong competitors. They
were excluded for a good reason: their incentive and ability to discriminate
against rivals and to misallocate costs between regulated and unregulated
businesses. But even though the reason was sound, it was never costless to
exclude them. And beyond the direct inefficiency of excluding competitors,
the Mf'l.s prohibitions contributed to the general atmosphere of protected
enclaves.
What can be done about this? The MFJ or quarantine solution
sacrifices some competition and some efficiencies, as well as contributing
to an atmosphere of pervasive restrictions. The purely regulatory solution
probably doesn't work very well, or so the court thought after examining
the record. The most promising approach, if it works, is to open up the
bottleneck.
The BOCs' incentives and ability to discriminate against rivals in
long-distance--to take the most prominent example of MFJ prohibi-
tions-depend on their market power in the local bottleneck. If we can open
up the bottleneck and implement vigorous competition there, then BOCs
will have little or no incentive to raise the costs of their long-distance
partners-and if they do so, those long-distance carriers and their customers
will have other choices, so the harm to consumers will be limited. Thus,
when there is enough competition in what is now the local bottleneck, it
will make good sense to let the BOCs into complementary businesses such
8. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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as manufacturing and long distance. This constitutes yet a farther benefit
from successfully introducing "local" competition.
Let me turn next to one of the most contentious areas of price
regulation and try to explain how it, too, may be greatly eased if we can
open up the bottleneck.
ACCESS CHARGES AND ACCESS REFORM
Today, an important part of LECs' revenue flow comes from charging
interconnection fees well above incremental cost to long-distance carriers,
and thus to their customers. In a sense this system is a triumph of
overcoming the alleged enmity of cross-subsidies and competition: the
subsidy flows, instead of being largely implicit and internal as they were
before MCI and the MFJ, are preserved in an explicit and-at least under
the MFJ-competitively neutral fashion. But as we move towards allowing
BOCs into long-distance the question of competitive neutrality arises again,
and in any case high access charges lead to economic inefficiencies from
high prices (users are dissuaded from long-distance calls they'd otherwise
make), cream-skimming rather than more efficient competition, and pressure
for blocking of competition that evades those charges. So it's time to look
again at the access charge system and ask: How does it fit with competi-
tion?
Most economists, I believe, would say that access charges should be
lower, and I agree. I also believe that, almost whatever regulators do or try
to do, in the long run competition will put pressure on access charges. But
I'd like to stress a different (though related) point, concerning the role of
access charges or their equivalent under the kind of competition that we are
trying to create.
Although the incremental cost of access service is way below current
access charges, access is a service, not a facility, and as such it has huge
joint costs with other services using the same facilities. What does this tell
us about how access will be priced in a competitive, or fairly-competitive,
market?
I believe the answer is that facilities will be competitively supplied, or
priced (under regulation) at an approximation of competitive prices, and that
the holder of a facility may price services at will. If anyone tries to price
the services of a facility too high overall, competitors will undercut those
offerings. How prices for services cover services' joint costs will be up to
the holder of the facilities. Competing facilities-holders (whether using their
own facilities or "unbundled" elements purchased from an incumbent) will
compete to offer customers the most attractive package of service prices that
they can afford to offer.
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Regulators will thus be able to exit from the burdensome business of
setting or approving service prices, with their immense joint and common
costs, and at most will have to ensure that the unbundled element prices are
appropriate. That should be a far easier task, because the cost of an
unbundled loop, for instance, is surely much more concrete than the cost of
interstate access service. The cost of things is much better defined than is
the cost of each of many services produced using those things.
I don't suggest that the outcome of such a market will be ideal. For
example, some economists have pointed out real problems associated with
terminating access: the customer is not the one who pays those charges, and
so a package of service prices that includes high terminating access charges
and low everything else may look good to the subscriber but gouge those
who call her. In addition, there may well be antitrust concerns associated
with competitors signing agreements with one another concerning the prices
they charge each other for essential inputs. Thus, there may remain a need
for limited procompetitive intervention. But in the long run-which I hope
is not too long-I hope for an end to much of Part 69.'
In the short run, we may need to remain more interventionist. We plan
to have an access reform proceeding this year. But we also must determine
how access charges and the Act's interconnection provisions fit together.
My proposed answers start from the principle that our decisions should
be consistent with the long-run answer sketched above. Therefore, I believe
that a carrier who takes an unbundled loop and local switching at cost-plus-
reasonable-profit is not obliged also to pay access charges to the incumbent.
A fortiori, the same is true of a carrier with its own facilities. On the other
hand, a carrier who takes local service as a wholesale offering from an
incument is obliged to pay the same charges (less avoided cost) as the end
user would otherwise (in effect) pay the incumbent, and this includes access
charges: those are part of the package of service prices the customer has
been taking, and therefore part of the package the reseller is buying,
although of course the reseller is free to reprice to the customer if it can
construct a package of service prices the customer would prefer.
Finally, can an interexchange carrier (IXC) demand termination under
the mutual termination requirement of the Act? My answer here is
somewhat more pragmatic: surely Congress would have made clear had it
intended that long-distance carriers could simply demand termination at
cost, which would do dramatic things to the LEC's finances. And wouldn't
it also imply that the LEC could demand termination by the IXC of long-
distance calls made by the LEC's customers? This answer also is linked
9. 47 C.F.R. § 69.1 (1996).
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with economic logic: it would make sense-especially in the infant stages
of competition--to prevent carriers in general and incumbents in particular
from setting monopolistic or anticompetitive terminating access rates to
direct competitors, but the argument is less strong for their rates to those
who are not direct competitors.
All this is by way of explaining that many benefits will flow from
implementing effective competition in the bottleneck. At long last, let's turn
to how we may be able to do that.
DEMONOPOLIZING: LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
UPWARDS
That then brings us, at last, to our central topic: How can you
demonopolize a natural monopoly? Believe it or not, the key is in the
abstract economic point I made earlier about intellectual property not being
so unique. Recall that the patent system requires sharing of intellectual
property after the patent expires. If we can do something analogous with
network externalities and economies of density, maybe the natural
monopoly won't be so natural any more.
Just as we would not want to reduce the life of a patent from
seventeen years to seventeen minutes, since that would reduce innovative
effort, so also it would be unwise policy to make all developers of network
externalities share them in all circumstances. I don't know of any worked-
out general policy for this problem. But, in the 1996 Telecom Act, I
believe, Congress asserted that sharing is the right thing in this industry at
this time."0 Our job, as I see it, in the interconnection proceeding, is to
implement that decision, to level the playing field upwards, and to remove
the economic entry barriers that the incumbent's installed base otherwise
creates.
Very broadly speaking, the requirement for mutual termination means
that network externalities are shared and preserved, and the resale and
unbundling requirements mean that economies of density are shared and
increased.
But merely requiring termination agreements, resale, and unbundling
is probably not enough, just as it would not be enough in terminating a
patent life to say that now licensing is required. To understand this, think
about the negotiation process. All negotiations take place against a backdrop
of "what will happen if we don't agree" and of "what will happen while
we're negotiating." Under what you might call the normal rules of business
negotiation, mutual termination won't happen until and unless there's a
10. Teleconunucations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
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mutual termination agreement. So, the backdrop is the situation we talked
about before, which is very bad for the entrant and not so bad for the
incumbent. This creates great asymmetries in bargaining power, and can be
expected to lead to asymmetric agreements that favor the incumbent.
Indeed, we saw such asymmetric agreements between LECs and cellular
carriers, even without the LEC's having an incentive to do down the other
carrier, as it would with a competitor. (I hope it's clear that these bargaining
power asymmetries stem from the differences in who needs an agreement,
not from the size of the parties.)
Therefore, for true sharing of network externalities, and for true
sharing of economies of density, some intervention in the bargaining
process is likely needed. There are several such interventions possible:
. The "long-distance entry carrot": An agreement is one of the
conditions for a BOC to be permitted to enter the long-distance
market. Of course, just that is specified in the Act. I don't see this as
fully equalizing bargaining power, but it clearly helps.
- The arbitration backdrop: We, or the states, could make it clear that
if negotiation goes to arbitration, then the arbitrated result wil reflect
costs, not asymmetric bargaining power.
• An interim rule: We, or the states, could attempt to repair the
bargaining power imbalance by specifying an outcome, such as bill-
and-keep, that is (thought to be) favorable to the entrant, for imple-
mentation during the negotiations. This would have the added
advantage of ensuring that entry is not delayed.
I hope I've said enough to convey my belief that economic logic
predicts that opening up the bottleneck will not happen automatically. All
of it needs to be negotiated in the shadow of prospective arbitration that
clearly rejects agreements based on differential bargaining power. Because
the differential bargaining power is there, implementing such arbitration is
not going to be an easy thing to do. The Act gives that awesome responsi-
bility to the states, guided by principles that we at the FCC promulgate.1"
As you know, one of the hardest and most controversial questions is how
much should be done here and how much by the states; I'm not going to
comment on that controversy today.
Instead, I'd like to give you a statistic compiled by one of the staff
here at the Commission, who went through the 1996 Telecom Act and
counted (electronically, I do hope) the number of times the word shall was
used. As I recall, it was 2,036 times. The question is, How can an Act that
says "shall" 2,036 times be deregulatory? And a related question: if
11. Id.
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Congress has deregulated, how come I keep being here till midnight?
Well, as you know, until recently we had the wonderful oxymoron of
the "Modification of Final Judgement," or MFJ. Now that the MFJ's gone,
we need another good oxymoron, and "wireless cable" doesn't quite have
the same ring to it. So here's a new oxymoron for telecom: Deregulation
through Rulemaking.
The point is that the procompetitive interconnection and unbundling
rules, like the procompetitive antitrust laws, swim upstream against some
powerful anticompetitive forces. So we need to implement rules to make
sure those forces don't win out. That's why we're up late and why we're
busy, and why Congress had to sound regulatory in what, in the long run,
will indeed be an extraordinarily deregulatory Act. And it's why the title of
this talk was "Creating" Competition, not just "Allowing."
One more point on leveling the playing field. It's important that the
playing field should be leveled upwards, not downwards. Like most
economists, I am uncomfortable with rules that forbid a firm from
exploiting efficiencies just because its rivals cannot do likewise. Such
handicapping, or leveling without regard for up or down, may make for a
good game, but the game is only a metaphor. When firms are hamstrung,
even in order to equalize them with other firms, consumers are liable to lose
out.
I've talked a lot about the benefits of creating competition, which after
all was the title of the talk. But Congress has made it clear that in parallel
with creating competition we must also work towards universal service. So
I'd like to close with a little discussion on that topic.
UNIVERSAL SERVICE
Universal service is a knotty problem. I would like to put forward
what I see as some of the most important "nots."
UNIVERSAL SERVICE IS NOT NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
In the telephone system, each subscriber values the network more, the
more people are connected: economists often describe this phenomenon as
a "network externality." Recall that, as a competitive issue, this is why
termination agreements are likely to be essential to entry.
It's tempting to construct a justification for universal service concerns
out of this externality: that we should intervene in the market so as to
increase penetration beyond what a competitive market would yield, because
that way all subscribers are better off. Qualitatively, that's correct, and it's
a nice thought that we can help out the disadvantaged in the name of
informed economic efficiency. Unfortunately, I'm not aware of any
[Vol. 49
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evidence that the universal service system, or its goals, are really based on
this.
Rather, I think we should frankly recognize that Congress, on our
behalf, has decided that Americans should have affordable access to
telecommunications, just as we have a similar policy with respect to
education and health care.
UNIVERSAL SERVICE DOES NOT JUSTIFY ENTRY BARRIERS
Many economists are suspicious of the goal of universal service. Why
is that? Are economists just ruthless, selfish rich people? Well, some of
them are (I could tell some economist jokes here). But I think there are
some good reasons to be suspicious of the way universal service is now
pursued. I think we can fix that, and pursue it in a more productive way;
indeed, I think we must do so.
Fundamentally, economists have two main concerns about the
universal service problem. First, doing anything other than pricing at cost
imposes some loss in economic efficiency. This can easily be overblown,
at least as far as the subsidy side of the equation is concerned. Pricing basic
service below cost for vulnerable consumers is, frankly, not going to impose
a big loss in efficiency, even if we reject the network externality argument.
A much bigger "allocative efficiency" problem comes with pricing access
and toll services way above incremental cost, in part in order to support the
subsidy of basic service. That is a serious problem, and in both our
universal service proceeding and our access reform proceeding we need to
take a hard look at how needed subsidies are funded. It also tells us that to
minimize the economic efficiency cost of universal service we should work
to minimize the dollar amount that has to be raised. Presumably this means
narrowly targeted subsidies to those who need them.
Economists' second concern is the problem of regulatory leverage
which I discussed earlier. When certain services are priced above cost in
order to fund a subsidy for other services provided by the same carrier, it
is tempting to keep that internal and implicit rather than explicit, and then
two bad things happen. First, artificial incentives to enter are created: an
entrant sees a price well above the incumbent's cost, and behold, the entrant
can beat that price, even if it is less efficient than the incumbent! Second,
whether the entry is efficient or inefficient, it threatens the implicit subsidy;
hence the incumbent and the regulator want to prevent the entry. To quote
Professor White again, "Cross-subsidies are the enemy of competition,
because competition is the enemy of cross-subsidies."
I said that many economists are suspicious of the goal of universal
service, and I've tried to explain their suspicions, which I believe must be
Number 1]
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taken seriously. Nevertheless, Congress has told us that both competition
and universal service are to be developed. Therefore, we economists must
work to ensure that whatever subsidies are needed to ensure universal
service are not the enemies of competition. This is not an insoluble
problem. On the contrary, I believe that a good solution can be developed
that is explicit and competitively neutral.
Explicitness means, to me, that the contribution to, or from, a
universal service fund should be clearly defined. We should be able to look
up in some database the subsidy to service Ted Turner's ranch, or the
contribution from the grocery around the comer. That way, competitors will
be able to know how much they can expect to get from or pay to the
universal service pool for serving any particular customer, and they will be
able to compete to do so.
Competitive neutrality means that, whoever now provides service and
takes or gives those funds, they are equally available to, and equally
expected from, competitors who might displace that incumbent.
UNIVERSAL SERVICE IS NOT PROTECTION OF INCUMBENTS
We often talk as if threats to the sources of subsidy flows were threats
to universal service, and this might be true if we failed to develop an
explicit, competitively neutral mechanism. But more immediately they are
threats to the incumbent's finances. For instance, if access charges are
bypassed, the immediate impact is on the LEC's bottom line. Perhaps, as
a result of this, many people carelessly talk about "universal service funds"
that will be used substantially--even mostly--to protect the revenue flows
of incumbents. This is, in my opinion, at best a terminological inexactitude.
We may perhaps owe something, legally or ethically, to the incum-
bents as we change the rules. Or we may instrumentally want to protect
them during a transition period so as to preserve the health and vibrancy of
their networks, which most of us will be relying on for some time to come.
I think there are reasonable arguments on both sides of this. Either way,
however, this is a separate concern from making sure that Americans can
afford telecommunications service, and we should keep the separateness
clear. This is not just a matter of clarity, important though clarity is. If the
two are confused, it may stymie attempts to make subsidy flows explicit
and competitively neutral.
UNIVERSAL SERVICE IS NOT BROAD SUBSIDY PROGRAMS
Today, according to most commentators, broad classes of users are
cross-subsidized by other classes of users. Businesses generally subsidize
residential users, but within the residential category heavy users subsidize
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light users, and urban users subsidize rural users.
Because light, rural, residential users are probably more likely to drop
off the network than are heavy, urban, business users, these broad subsidy
flows are not completely unrelated to universal service concerns. But the
relationship is not very close. Camden, New Jersey, for example, is often
cited as a disgraceful example of low penetration. Should subscribers in that
urban, low-income, largely African-American city be subsidizing telephone
subscribers among the rural gentry in the horse country of New Jersey
through a statewide scheme, or prosperous ranchers in the freedom-loving
expanses of Montana through an interstate scheme? I believe not.
To craft an affordable true universal service scheme, it seems to me,
we must narrowly target assistance to those who need it. Lifeline rates make
much more sense than massive schemes to try to keep all rates
low--indeed, as a matter of arithmetic, a cross-subsidy scheme cannot
possibly keep all rates low.
We must also recognize that the monthly price of basic service is by
no means the only determinant of penetration. Many of those who drop off
the network do so because they run up large toll bills which they are then
unable to pay. Some have suggested that therefore basic service should not
be contingent on payment of toll bills, any more than hospitals should
refuse treatment to those who are behind on their cable bill. But whether
this is wise or not, we-an inclusive we-need to think harder about what
will make telephone service more appealing to those who currently don't
take it. Would some customers prefer not to have "1+" toll service at all,
if they can't trust themselves or their friends not to overuse it? Would some
customers prefer a preset limit? These are, in a sense, marketing problems,
and we need to bring that perspective into front and center in the universal
service debate. Competition will help us do so.
To make subsidies to those who need them competitively neutral, it
must be possible for any supplier of telecommunications to compete for the
subsidy attaching to a particular user. If we ensure that the subsidy is
enough to make service affordable for that user, it follows that competing
for the subsidy is attractive for at least some carriers. Under competitive
neutrality, it will be most attractive for the carrier who can most efficiently
serve that user.
Undoubtedly, creating real competition with real universal service is
even more demanding than creating real competition. But we should not let
this obscure the basic fact that competition by itself makes more things
affordable for more people more of the time. In the long run it is consumers
and universal service who will suffer if, in the name of universal service,
competition is hamstrung or stifled.
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